Reward-predicting stimuli can induce maladaptive behavior by provoking action tendencies that conflict with long-term goals. Earlier, we showed that when human participants were permitted to respond for a reward in the presence of a task-irrelevant, reward-predicting stimulus (i.e. goCSþ trials), the CS þ provoked an action tendency to respond compared to when a non-rewarding CS À stimulus was present (i.e. goCSÀ trials). However, when participants were not permitted to respond, response suppression was recruited to mitigate the action tendency that was triggered by the motivating CS þ stimulus (i.e. on nogoCSþ trials) (Freeman et al., 2014). Here we tested the hypothesis that repeated response suppression over a motivationally-triggered action tendency would reduce subsequent CS þ provocation. We compared groups of participants who had different proportions of nogoCSþ trials, and we measured CSþ provocation on go trials via reaction time. Our results showed that CSþ provocation on go trials was reduced monotonically as the proportion of nogoCSþ trials increased. Further analysis showed that these group differences were best explained by reduced provocation on goCS þ trials that followed nogoCSþ (compared to nogoCSÀ ) trials. Follow-up experiments using a neurophysiological index of motor activity replicated these effects and also suggested that, following nogoCSþ trials, a response suppression mechanism was in place to help prevent subsequent CS þ provocation. Thus, our results show that performing response suppression in the face of a motivating stimulus not only controls responding at that time, but also prevents provocation in the near future.
Introduction
The environment is filled with reward-predicting, Pavlovian stimuli that can motivate our actions (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Gupta and Aron, 2011; Hajcak et al., 2007; Talmi et al., 2008) and bias our decisions (Bray et al., 2008; Chiu et al., 2014; Klein-Flügge and Bestmann, 2012) . Such stimuli can be beneficial when obtaining the reward is congruent with our goals (e.g., a marathon runner running faster after passing a picture of a gold medal). Oftentimes, however, appetitive Pavlovian stimuli can motivate actions that conflict with our goals (e.g., a recovering smoker who buys cigarettes after smelling smoke), resulting in "misbehavior of the will" (Dayan et al., 2006) . It is therefore essential that, in such circumstances, we learn to control action tendencies that are provoked by appetitive, motivating stimuli.
In an experimental setting, the way in which Pavlovian stimuli motivate our actions towards rewards can be studied by taking advantage of a phenomenon called Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT). For a typical PIT task, the participant first undergoes a session of instrumental training and a session of Pavlovian training to develop response-reward and stimulus-reward relationships, respectively. Then, in the Transfer phase, the Pavlovian stimuli are incidentally presented while the participant again engages in instrumental, reward-driven behavior 1 (Holmes et al., 2010) . A "PIT effect" occurs when, in the Transfer phase, Pavlovian stimuli previously paired with reward invigorate instrumental responding compared to stimuli not previously paired with reward.
In an earlier study, we used a novel hybrid go-nogo/PIT task to examine how control is implemented over a motivating stimulus that provokes action tendencies (Freeman et al., 2014 
